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Abstract 
Distribution has been a key ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) area for 
airlines since decades ago and is a sector dominated by four (now three) Global 
Distribution Systems (GDSs) whose primacy has been threatened over the last three years 
by a set of new players, the so called GDS New Entrants (GNEs).  GNEs emerged with 
the advent of Internet and open source technology as ‘disintermediation’ facilitators  and 
generated vast interest from airlines because of their proposition to reduce the cost of 
distribution.   
 
This paper explores the impact of  ICTs on airlines with a focus on GDSs, provides an 
overview of the changing market dynamics, analyses the environment that led to the 
appearance of the GNEs and pinpoints the issues behind their until now failure to provide 
a true alternative to the GDSs.  The analysis complements existing academic research in 
that it clarifies the critical issues in the air travel distribution field and provides an 
overview of current industry developments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Internet technology and web based commerce have changed the airline industry 
dramatically in the last ten years. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
have always played a determinant role in the airline sector but with the advent of Internet 
and open source technology their impact is becoming more crucial and evident.  Internet 
embracement by travellers allowed airlines to bypass the traditional distribution pattern 
through travel agencies and sell direct to end consumers.  Web distribution combined 
with cheaper and more flexible technology allowed the new players to the market, low 
cost airlines (LCCs) to implement effective low-cost direct distribution strategies and 
intensify competition in the sector. Traditional airlines could not afford to rely on 
outdated distribution strategies and had to invest heavily in new technology to support the 
online Web sites, as post September 11 harsh economic conditions and low-fare carriers 
transformed the marketplace and passgner needs and preferences changed. 
 
Distribution has been a key ICT area for airlines since decades ago and is a sector 
dominated by four (soon three) Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) whose primacy has 
been threatened over the last three years by a set of new players, the so called GDS New 
Entrants (GNEs). 
 
This paper explores the impact of  ICTs on airlines with a focus on GDSs,  provides an 
overview of the changing market dynamics, analyses the environment that led to the 
appearance of the GNEs,  and assesses the issues behind their until now failure to provide 
a true alternative to the GDSs.  Finally, the paper drives conclusions from extensive 
research in industry data sources and academic literature, as well as discussions with 
industry experts and pinpoints that despite their initial failure to offer a true alternative to 
GDS distribution, GNEs’ opportunity to be on the play is still alive.  The extraordinarily 
dynamic nature of airline distribution makes any opinion about future developments in 
the sector sound like a crystal-ball prediction but experts seem to agree on a number of 
trends that are to stay.  
 
2. The role of ICTs in the airline industry 
 
Information technology is heavily embedded in every element of airlines operations. 
Recently it has become popular to broaden the term to explicitly include the field 
electronic communication and the abbreviation ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) is being used. Information and Communication technologies may be defined 
as "electronic means of capturing, processing, storing, and disseminating information" 
and provide new mechanisms for handling existing resources and information.  
 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can provide powerful strategic and 
tactical tools for organizations, which, if properly applied and used, could bring great 
advantages in promoting and strengthening their competitiveness (M. Porter 2001, 1985).  
Few other industries rely on so many partners to collaborate closely for delivering their 
products and few other value chains are as elaborate as the one for travel (D. Buhalis, 
1998). All airlines rely heavily on ICTs for their operations and management and employ 
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them for a wide range of business functions. As a result ICTs have a major impact on cost 
and operational efficiency of airlines. There is an indirect and complex casual 
relationship between ICTs and profitability that is difficult to be quantified and 
generalized. There is evidence however, that well managed ICTs can generate 
tremendous value for organisations (S. Lee, 2001). 
 
The portfolio of solutions for airline planning and control ranges from network planning, 
code share handling and crew management, to pricing, price distribution and revenue 
management. Airline ICTs are further supplemented by business intelligence services, 
marketing and sales solutions. Table 1 summarises the areas of ICT usage by airlines. 
 
Table 1 




We can identify two main groups of airline business functions supported by ICTs.  The 
first includes an airline´s flight operational activities and the second its business 
management and control functions.  As far as operations are concerned ICTs contribute to 
the optimisation of flight related procedures and processes. Airlines´ operations 
supported by ICTs include dispatch and coordination of flights and related resources 
namely crew, aircraft, passenger and freight processing, and airport facilities such as 
gates, ramps, baggage handling etc. From a business management and control point of 
view, airlines employ ICTs in most functions, from administrative tasks and accounting 
to financial management, human resources and procurement.  
    
Airlines use technology to develop and manage their business model as well as to 
monitor the external environment and competition, undertake revenue analysis, 
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forecasting, maintain historical data, predict demand, and design desirable products. ICTs 
are critical for monitoring and forecasting the performance of Strategic Business Units 
(SBUs) and for deciding which markets airlines should penetrate and how. Routes and 
crew planning, frequency of service, choice of aircraft and developing relationships with 
strategic partners are key functions supported by ICTs (D. Buhalis, 1998). Strategic 
pricing and yield management are supported by running complex algorithms to establish 
best performance and profitability levels and optimisation and simulation tools are used 
heavily to maximise revenue in both network planning and revenue management 
processes (J. Hansman, 2005). 
 
One of the most critical areas of ICT contribution in the airline industry has been  
distribution and collaboration with partners (D. Buhalis, 2004).  And clearly the most 
significant recent technology factor affecting an airline´s business has been the internet 
which has shifted the playing field and undermined many of the schedule and pricing 
assumptions of the traditional airline industry.   
 
Airline distribution has been for many years synonymous to Central Reservation Systems 
(CRSs) later termed Global Distribution Systems (GDSs).  The GDS technology and 
travel agency network has been for decades the main distribution channel for airline 
product sales.  GDSs, progressively consolidated their position to only four major 
systems, namely Sabre, Amadeus, Galileo and Wordspan (the two latter now both 
acquired by Travelport, Inc.). This was due to their predominance as the largest existing 
repositories of travel stock information, with backing from the travel suppliers that had 
created and funded them (D. Buhalis, M. Licata, 2002). The GDS sector oligopoly was 
further supported by the fact that impressive upfront investment in technology 
infrastructure was required to run a GDS raising important entry barriers to new entrants 
(Amadeus mainframe centre in Erding, Germany, was said to have the second biggest 
database after NASA). 
 
The advent of the Internet allowed travellers to bypass travel agents and GDSs and book 
direct. Furthermore, advances in technology have allowed travel product hosting and 
distribution in an easier and less costly manner (at least from a technology point of view). 
These market developments brought about the idea of ‘disintermediation’ of travel 
agencies and GDSs with Low Cost Carriers, using Internet as the main means of 
distribution of their fares and tickets, as the keenest supporters of direct distribution.  
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3. Airline distribution through GDSs 
 
The GDSs have served as the nexus of electronic commerce in travel for decades, 
providing virtual real-time connectivity between thousands of suppliers of travel 
inventory (airlines, hotels, car rental, tour operators, cruise lines, etc.) and hundreds of 
thousands of retails sellers of travel products. The four major GDSs combined handle 
over 1.4 million travel transactions a year.   
 
The GDS platforms evolved from the original airline central reservation systems (CRSs) 
first built decades ago. Up to the 1970s travel agencies had to locate the best routes and 
fares for their customers in airlines’ manuals and then call the carrier for availability and 
reservation.  The emergence of CRSs not only provided a reservation tool and real-time 
connectivity to travel agencies. More importantly CRSs were effectively developed into 
marketing and distribution systems and contributed significantly to the competitiveness 
of vendor/host airlines (K. Boberg, F.Collison, 1985; L. Truit, V. Teye and M. Farris, 
1991). GDSs provided airlines a network of more than fifty thousand selling points 
worldwide each and the ability to tailor their offer and prices to meet market conditions. 
 
After decades of leadership as the carriers´ favourite distribution option, the GDS firms 
are now facing a number of changes that threaten their margins and business. These 
changes (described in section 4 below) are radically transforming the dynamics of airline 
distribution and the rules of distribution game.  
 
4. Latest issues in airline distribution 
 
4.1 Shift towards online sales, direct distribution and LCCs 
 
The emergence of the Internet in the mid-1990s forced airlines to reshape their 
distribution strategy in order to boost their competitiveness. At the same time, a number 
of no-frills airlines emerged in both Europe and the US. These airlines developed simple 
distribution strategies and took full advantage of the Internet for communicating with 
their clientele (Mintel, 2001).   
Both incumbent and low-fare carriers identified the Internet as a major opportunity to 
tackle distribution costs and to reengineer the structure of the industry (D. Bouhalis, 
2004). LCCs were the first ones to invest heavily in driving direct sales through their 
online sales vehicles. They provided incentives for consumers to book online in order to 
ensure that they would not be distributed through the GDSs, in a way forcing their clients 
online (R. Chu, 2001). Consumers rapidly identified the Internet and airline Web sites as 
the platform to benefit from lower prices. In their effort to compete scheduled carriers, 
traditionally reliant upon GDS platforms, had to follow suit and develop their online 
presence. Major network airlines are determined to get on a comparable footing with the 
low-cost carriers (at least for the distribution of their leisure fares) and they are doing so 
by investing heavily their direct Web business and reducing their GDS distribution costs.  
Competition has set out fierce resulting in open price wars. As traditional airlines extend 
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their offer of low priced tickets, their revenue margins shrink accordingly and lowering 
GDS distribution costs becomes imperative. 
Internet also brought about the appearance of online travel agencies in the marketplace 
such as Travelocity and Expedia.  Online travel agencies consumer success and high 
ambitions made airlines react setting up Orbitz (as a start-up dubbed “T2” for 
supposedly “Travelocity Terminator”), an online Web site with direct connect 
technology to airlines, bypassing GDSs and their booking fees. This entity has become a 
powerful competitor only just behind second place Travelocity in market share, and 
enables carriers to connect directly via its technology to avoid GDS booking fees. But 
Orbitz also had some unintended consequences. Its use of powerful faring and shopping 
technology (from ITA Software) delivered a richer, more comprehensive view of 
available flight options and fares. Combined with a surging industry focus on discounted 
Web fares Orbitz helped accelerate the commoditisation of online air distribution and 
put further downward pressure on prices. In short, the airlines successfully addressed 
one problem (cost of distribution) but fuelled another problem (lower prices), which in 
turn generated more pressure to lower the cost of distribution. 
With the online sales and direct distribution developments GDSs have found themselves 
under the threat of ‘disintermediation’ and ‘commoditisation’.  As airlines go direct, 
GDSs seem no longer necessary. At the very least, with the appearance of online 
alternatives to the GDS, their product is turned into a commodity that does not justify a 
high booking fee. GDSs have reacted against the threats posed by the shift to online 
direct bookings in three ways: first they developed internet based technology providing 
the transactional infrastructure for Internet travel portals. Second they reinvented 
themselves as main technology suppliers for airlines extending their technology offer to a 
wider range of ICTs and technology consultancy services. Finally, GDS's have tried to 
pre-empt the airlines´ Web sites by establishing their own online travel agency Web sites, 
such as Travelocity (owned by Sabre) or Opodo (owned by Amadeus).  
GDS and travel agency efforts to protect an intermediary based distribution model, 
carriers´ direct share of online air ticket sales will reach 70% in 2007, well over double 
the share of online travel agencies. The airlines branded web sites have been enjoying 
20% plus growth year over year, and their marketing initiatives are driving customer 
loyalty and a powerful shift in consumer behaviour.  This level of activity on the part of 
airlines will only accelerate in an effort to shift more and more share from the online 
agencies to their web sites.   
 
What is today clear is that the GDS model based purely on travel agency distribution is 
being eroded by the shift to airline direct online sales. The increase in airlines´ 
negotiation power became apparent in the latest rounds of GDS-airline contracting that 
really focused on the cost of distribution for discounted leisure fares where it is said that 
airlines have achieved discounts up to 40% in their booking fees. The leisure travel 
segment is the one where airlines have the most leverage, yet these are the products 
which have the highest relative cost of distribution.  
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What is also clear is that ones suffering most from the shift to online direct sales are 
traditional travel agencies. Not all TAs will survive this era. The new airlines-endorsed 
GDS programmes for agencies impose steep cuts in incentive payments and allow for 
charges to be paid to the airline in case of selling low-value tickets. The shift is more 




Changing GDS model 
 
 





4.2 Growth and risks in air travel demand 
 
At the level of air travel demand it would seem that the future could not be brighter.  
Demand is growing worldwide as a result of economic development, globalisation, 
international trade, declining passenger fares and improved airline services. World 
airlines experienced average traffic growth of around 5% per year in the last 10 years. 
Embraer projects that world air traffic demand will reach 10.250 billing RPKs (revenue 
passenger kilometres) in 2025, up from 3.750 billion in 2005, representing an average 
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growth of 5.1% per year in the next 20 years. Over the next years, developing economies 
such as China and India will make a greater contribution towards global economic 
growth and deregulation in these parts of the world is expected to provide substantial 
benefits for passengers, airlines and the wider economy.  
 
Despite such phenomenal growth projections air travel demand is subject to a series of 
old and new risks such as economic downturns, unpredictable geopolitical events, rising 
fuel costs and environmental concerns.  Uncertainty in all these factors makes airlines 
vulnerable to the future and presses them to streamline costs (including distribution) as 
much as possible in order to protect potential falls in demand and/or revenue margins. 
 
4.3 GDS deregulation 
 
US and Europe regulated the GDS sector in the 1980s.  These regulations were 
introduced at a time when GDSs were owned by airlines and there was a visible threat 
that GDSs would provide special treatment to their owners (for example biased display 
of the airline’s flights on the travel agent’s screen) and hassle fair competition. 
 
As US airlines divested their stakes in their GDSs and Internet widened up the 
distribution and buying choices for airlines and end consumers respectively, it was 
thought that regulation was no longer necessary. In 2004, GDSs were deregulated in the 
US and the European Commission is currently examining whether to partially revise or 
fully abolish its Code of Conduct for CRSs (in Europe, Amadeus is still partly owned by 
Iberia, Air France and Lufthansa and hence the discussion on a partial instead of a full 
deregulation). 
 
Deregulation brought to a new state of affairs where airlines are no longer obliged to 
participate equally in all GDSs and can steer business to selected GDSs, biased seat 
availability displays are no longer prohibited and airlines can negotiate freely booking 
fees and level of participation in each GDS. 
 
As a result of GDS deregulation in the US and the prospect of an amended deregulation 
in Europe, GDSs are changing their business model, allowing for more flexibility in their 
pricing (F. Alamdari, K. Mason, 2006).  But what deregulation effectively means is 
additional pressure on GDS margins.  According F. Alamdari and K. Mason 60% of 
airlines see deregulation as an opportunity to gain greater control over their distribution 
channels, and to have their relationship with GDS companies on a “value for money” 
basis.  
 
4.4. Technological advances 
 
As mentioned earlier, an important entry barrier to the GDS business has been reliance 
of the GDS model on a heavy technological platform. GDSs based their system 
architectures on mainframe computing platforms running TPF, IBM´s durable 
Transaction Processing Facility OSS. These platforms served the GDSs and airlines well 
for decades because of their ability to handle huge transaction volumes (up to ten 
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thousands per second) with superb reliability and response times.  They deliver secure 
systems with a 99.9% assurance of connectivity, response times of a fraction of a second 
and allow them to offer most accurate and comprehensive fares and pricing systems 
worldwide and process billions of travel transactions monthly. 
 
With the Internet explosion the GDSs with their legacy mainframes were described as 
dinosaurs. The GDS applications designed decades ago have been repeatedly amended 
to accommodate new functionality, each time adding complexity and cost.  But since the 
emergence of more flexible Internet-based technologies in the 1990s flexibility and open 
architecture have become key requirements in the market. New technology not only 
makes it easier to write applications in modern programming languages with an 
emphasis on adaptability and ease of integration with other systems. It also allows such 
applications to be run on PC-class servers running Linux OS, enabling a major up-front 
cost advantage over IBM mainframes in terms of hardware and software licenses. 
 
Such technological advances have a dual impact on GDS.  On the one hand they lower 
the entry barriers and open a window of opportunity for new entrants in the sector and 
on the other hand constitute big expense item to GDSs who in order not to become 
obsolete are obliged to migrate their legacy systems to open system architecture.  All 
GDSs are currently engaged in costly exercises of moving toward an open system 
architecture (Amadeus is said to have invested more than one billion euros in the 
migration project).    
 
5. GDS New Entrants (GNEs) 
 
This changing environment with its hassles for the GDS industry gave rise in 2005 to a 
number of companies – including Triton Distribution Systems, ITA Software, G2 
Switchworks and Farelogix– claiming to be developing GDS alternatives. In an 
atmosphere of airlines complaining about the cost of distribution and calling for an end to 
the oligopoly of the GDSs, the new entrants promised to grant big reductions in supplier 
segment fees and more flexible and functional distribution technology.   
 
One of the GNEs, G2 SwitchWorks, is a Chicago based company founded by a team of 
former Orbitz executives. Another, Cambridge, Mass.–based ITA Software, played a key 
role in the Orbitz technology platform and is today a leader in airfare shopping and 
pricing technology. Farelogix is Miami-based and offers an application layer (the FLX 
Platform) that enables distributors to aggregate and manage content from multiple 
sources, including the GDSs, the Internet and direct connects to suppliers’ reservation 
systems. Its CEO does not see it as an alternative GDS, but rather as a bridging solution 
to enable agencies to better managed inventory sourcing from multiple channels.  
However, the firm is offering direct connectivity to some airlines, making it an 
alternative channel for suppliers to distribute to agencies (Phocuswright, 2006). 
GNEs received considerable attention in 2005 when they announced an estimated pricing 
for suppliers at a considerable discount from the then GDS fee levels of $2.00-$2.50 per 
booking.  Triton and G2 SwitchWorks promised savings upwards of 75% of GDS costs, 
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while ITA suggested pricing could start around 40 cents per segment for its alternative 
GDS offering (dubbed “1U”).  Furthermore, GNEs promised improved product and 
service emphasising that building their systems from scratch allowed them to design 
flexible systems with a focus on customer-centric functionality.  Amongst others, GNEs 
offered unlimited capacity for new products and services, new products for airlines such 
as private fares and preferred display of inventory to authorized agencies, interoperability 
with any back-end system eliminating the integration burden, scalability through Service 
Oriented Architecture and secure direct connections to air carriers.  
However, three years ahead it is still very uncommon for a travel agency to operate 
without the use of at least one of the big four GDS systems. Despite the announcement of 
several major agencies in beta testing and important supplier deals from G2 Switchworks 
and Ferlogix, the GNEs account for well under 1% of the US domestic market for 
segments, according to PhocusWright estimates. 
 
6. Reasons behind GNEs’ initial failure to provide an alternative to GDSs 
 
GNEs have yet to live up to the expectations as their market penetration has been less 
than 1% (phcous nov 06).  Instead of migrating to the new GDS promising environment 
the airlines have used the GNE offer as a negation tool in their expiring contract 
negotiations with the GDSs.  Major carriers have apparently extracted substantial 
concessions (30-40% discounts) and achieved many of their goals in these negotiations. 
Why have the GNE´s (when they seemed to address the two most crucial airline 
concerns, superior technology and cost of distribution) failed to date to win market share 
from the GDSs? There are several important reasons for this: 
 
6.1 Overestimation of technology offer 
 
GNE’s direct connect promise has remained unfulfilled. To date only the major online 
agency, Orbitz, has implemented airline direct connects that bypass the GDSs, and only 
with a limited number of major U.S.carriers. One big barrier to direct connect 
implementation is the technical challenges, especially in the corporate marketplace, 
where travel management companies (TMCs) have rigorous and complex requirements 
for fulfilment, exception handling and back-office integration.  Capability to meet these 
requirements, which the GDSs have already invested in heavily to support add, to the cost 
and complexity of interfaces.  Another big barrier is meeting the complex requirements 
set by airline alliances and airlines’ interlining needs.  GNE’s technology is of course 
open source and flexible but it has not yet been developed to cover full functionality 
currently provided by the GDSs.   
 
6.2 GDSs retaliated with  updated technology and offering concessions 
 
GDSs did not remain still to the GNEs’ threat.  All major GDS introduced to a larger or 
smaller extent important changes to their pricing models substituiting their originally 
“same price for all segments fees” with  channel based pricing schemes  distinguishing 
for example between direct and travel agency sales, domestic and international flights or 
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between leisure and corporate segments.  This way they managed to offer concessions to 
airlines in the most price sensitive low cost segments whilst maintaining higher fees for 
the higher value tickets.   
 
GDS also introduced efforts at the technology level. First as seen in section 4 they have 
all started migration programs to open architectures and second they are developing new 
products and functionality to adapt to the ever changing needs of the sector.  For example 
they developed for smaller airlines and low cost carriers the ability to connect to a GDS 
network using XML Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) which allows airlines to 
connect to the GDS with a simpler protocol, and even opt for alternative arrangements 
where an airline prices the itinerary instead of relying on third party fare filing 
requirements and the GDS’ pricing engine. 
 
6.3 Missed the travel agency side of the equation 
 
While the GNEs generated vast interest from airlines because of their proposition to 
reduce the cost of distribution, penetration into the agency side of the equation remained 
scarce.  The GDSs offer suppliers worldwide distribution to thousands of travel agencies, 
both traditional and online.  Without booking volume generated, lower distribution fees 
have no meaning to airlines.  
 
One of the reasons why travel agencies did not buy into the GNEs model was that the 
level of content and functionality offered to them was inferior from the one supplied by 
GDSs.  GDSs, have, over many decades and after serious investments, managed to 
develop an almost one-stop-shop content and sales platform for travel agencies. GDSs 
offer aggregated content (all major airlines, hotels car rental companies and many cruise 
lines and tour operators), global offering, proven, 99.9% reliable networks, interline 
capabilities, guaranteed airline pricing, established customer service support, ancillary 
vendors, highest security for personal data, innovative products to help agencies such as 
group capabilities and all kinds of front, -mid and back-office solutions for travel 
agencies to handle the full reservation process.  GNEs came into the market with a far 
more limited product for the agencies. 
 
Most importantly GDSs offer agency incentives for reaching goals. To cut down cost to 
the airline GNEs abolish the incentives paid to the travel agency and claim to replace it 
with better fares content from the airlines. But agencies and travel management 
companies are not encouraged if there are no attractive incentive schemes. 
 
The GDSs accounted for 59% of all flights segments booked in 2006 (PhocusWright), 
and while this shares is declining gradually, it still represents a substantial portion of the 
total marketplace. Remove low-cost carriers such as Southwest, JetBlue and AirTran (all 
of which generate a far greater portion of their sales through their Web sites) from the 
segment share assessment, then the GDS segment share gets much closer to 70%.  The 
top six U.S. network carriers  remain dependent upon the GDSs for a substantial majority 
of their sales. 
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6.4 GDS lead to higher value customers 
 
Not only do the GDSs give access to a wide travel agency network.  Most importantly 
GDSs steer to “higher yield” customers.  Indeed, JetBlue VP Revenue Management R. 
Zeni has said that tickets sold through GDSs have a $30 average fare premium over those 
sold via its own Web site JetBlue.com.  This is so because a significant majority 
corporate travel is booked through travel agencies and the GDSs, including bookings 
generated from online corporate booking tools. Currently, nearly 81% of online corporate 
bookings and 75% of offline transactions go through intermediaries (traditional and 
Internet travel management companies) which use the GDSs for almost all transactions 
and which as seen above are reluctant to migrate to a GNE platform. Furthermore, many 
large corporations are using automated tools that sit on top of GDS technology to manage 
their employee travel needs which makes the switch to a GNE even more challenging.   
Another important aspect for business travellers is the possibility to reserve complex 
itineraries on both national and international basis.  Such itineraries are only possible 
when the reservation system allows “interlining” that is the ability to see (and reserve) in 
a single availability display which flights can be combined to reach a specific destination. 
GNEs still lack this capability.  
Because of the higher margins it provides, the corporate travel segments not only attracts 
traditional carriers. Recently, more and more LCCs are making efforts to get business 
from this segment. 
 
In order to make their product accessible to large corporations Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) 
need to have their offer fully integrated in the corporate travel tools, now only possible if 
they participate in the main GDSs.  Full integration would allow for example corporate 
travellers to compare the LCC offer with traditional carriers on a single availability 
search (on the contrary, the lack of real-time comparison makes the travel purchase 
process more complex and cumbersome).  
 
LCCs want to enter the higher-yield segment available via the GDSs without losing their 
customers to online agencies. A good example of how LCCs take advantage of the GDS 
model is JetBlue which negotiated to provide the full range of its discounted fares to 
traditional travel agencies but only through the designed corporate bookings tools.  This 
gave JetBlue a way to win new business travellers without eroding bookings on its 
website.  
 
7.  Conclusion on the future for GNEs and GDSs 
 
Despite the predictions that the GDS business would disappear, GDS still account for 
nearly 60% of all air segments booked in the US market today (source PhocusWright) 
and three out four major GDS continue to enjoy healthy growth and margins. The 
prospect of major carriers withdrawing from GDSs in the short term is becoming 
increasingly unlikely as GDSs cut off prices and shift to a more diversified range of 
airline technology solutions, embracing a role of integrated technology partners. The mid 
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and long term prospects for the airline-GDS relationship are nevertheless a question 
mark. 
 
The shift of distribution power from travel agencies to airlines is now a fact with the 
airlines stepping forward as winners (they have managed to reduce distribution costs 
through reduced GDS fees in the lower value discount fares and through cutting off 
commissions and incentives to travel agencies).  GDSs have also managed to maintain 
overall revenue and profit levels by hooking into airlines’ web bookings with internet 
booking engine technology and maintaining their travel agency and airline clientele with 
strong content, advanced reservation technology and full-service integrating technology 
platforms.  
 
GDSs are gradually losing distribution market share but the overall transaction volume 
they have been handling has been growing as air demand and in particular corporate 
international bookings (the segment where GDSs are stronger) are in the last years in an 
upturn.  With airlines and GDSs on the winner side it results that travel agencies have 
been the participants of the distribution triangle (airlines-GDS-travel agencies) suffering 
the most. The largest losses have been experienced by smaller, leisure travel focused 
travel agencies which, as expected, are facing serious consolidation. This is particularly 
true in the US where the shift in distribution power was more prominent (currently 1% of 
travel management companies account for more than 60% of the TMC market) due to the 
earlier introduction in this market of the elements that have brought to this shift (Internet 
penetration, direct airline sales, low cost carriers’ growth, and deregulation of GDSs).       
 
The distribution power game has still not finished as the market conditions are still very 
dynamic. First, GDS deregulation has still not shown its full impact; deregulation is still 
not the case in Europe and the rapidly growing Asian markets, and airlines still make 
their content available to all GDSs and travel agencies. But this could change and in the 
future airlines might not commit themselves to providing all of their content to the GDSs. 
This would put additional downward pressure on GDS fees and GDS would need to find 
alternative sources of value to their service to justify their prices. Second, airlines remain 
focused on driving business through their own Web sites taking an increasingly higher 
number of booking transactions away from online travel agencies and from the GDSs. It 
is still unknown what the final share of direct versus indirect sales will be but airlines and 
travel management companies will fight fiercely to channel leisure and corporate 
travellers to their Web sites. 
 
In this atmosphere GNEs may have fallen short of the high expectations they initially 
raised, but they show a true potential as future distribution players. Should the GNEs lock 
in contracts with key travel management companies that drive  substantial volume, this 
could put in jeopardy a large share of corporate travel transactions that today comprise 
the GDSs´ main business and shift even more power away from GDSs toward airline. As 
it is the travel management companies that are delivering the vastly higher ticket prices, 
not the GDSs (as their customer would purchase higher ticket value travel regardless of 
the technology they use), GNEs could gradually fill in the gap with GDS on the travel 
agency network side.  Central to the GNE distribution strategy has to be fitting into the 
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complex and chaotic world of agency systems, especially for fulfilment, reporting and 
other back-office functions in the corporate arena.  If GNEs manage to fill the 
functionality gap in these areas, their chances to evolve into a considerable distribution 
channel will increase. 
 
GNEs have already made some important steps in the direction of extending their TMC 
base. G2 Switchworks has signed deals with Carlson Wagonlit Travel, Priceline and 
Trisept Solutions for the deployment of the G2 Agent tool with the VAX leisure booking 
systems for travel agents.  Farelogix too has achieved a footing on the airline and travel 
agency sides, and ITA Software, whose immediate strategic emphasis has shifted to 
airlines reservations hosting with its launch customer Air Canada, has made it clear it is 
fully committed to its distribution product.  Certainly more volume would be necessary 
for GNEs to establish themselves as serious players in airline distribution.      
 
Although GNE market penetration has yet to be proven GNEs as they continue to build 
their capabilities and gain acceptance in the agency community augur a gradual shift in 
market share in the years to come. Potential growth by the GNEs would increase the 
pressure for GDSs to reduce booking fees but it is also possible that the contrary happens 
with GNEs increasing their bookings fees to allow them to pay incentives and thus gain a 
footing in the TMC community. 
 
GDSs still represent critical access to the premium (airlines´ favourite) corporate segment 
but they will have to give more ground on lower fares and deliver on improved 
merchandising and other functionality. While more downward pressure on segment fees 
for low fare travel is expected, airlines will accept higher fees for access to the premium 
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